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Abstract 
The recent Roast Busters investigation exposed serious flaws in the processes of New 
Zealand Police, specifically in relation to the investigation and prosecution of sexual 
offending. Sexual violence complaints in New Zealand are rarely made and when they are, 
it is of upmost importance that police respond to and investigate the allegations sensitively 
and comprehensively. This reinforces the need for strong police accountability. Police 
accountability is limited by the important principle of police independence, which is 
designed to ensure that the police are not improperly influenced by political motivations. 
This paper uses Bovens’ framework of accountability to assess the key mechanisms that 
hold the police to account for their investigative and prosecutorial decisions making. This 
paper examines internal investigation procedures, ministerial accountability, the courts, 
the Independent Police Conduct Authority and the media. The paper recommends 
improvements be made to increase accountability of the police. The key recommendations 
of the paper are that the courts be more willing to consider judicial review of prosecutorial 
decisions and the Independent Police Conduct Authority be given the power to investigate 
of its own motion.  
 
Key Words 
Police Independence, IPCA, Accountability, Roast Busters, Prosecution 
 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding table of contents, footnotes, and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 12, 419 words. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3  
 
Contents 
I Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
II Police Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offending ....................................... 3 
A Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3 
B The Roast Busters Investigation ................................................................................. 3 
C Police Handling of a Sexual Assault Allegation ......................................................... 5 
D Sexual Assault Generally ............................................................................................. 6 
III The Principle of Police Independence ........................................................................ 7 
IV Defining and Analysing Accountability ................................................................... 10 
A Background ................................................................................................................ 10 
B Internal Investigation ................................................................................................ 13 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 13 
2 Current internal investigation processes .................................................. 13 
3 Recommendations for change .................................................................... 16 
C Ministerial Accountability ......................................................................................... 16 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 16 
2 Current ministerial accountability ............................................................ 17 
3 Recommendations for change .................................................................... 18 
D Courts  ...................................................................................................................... 19 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 19 
2 Current court accountability ..................................................................... 19 
3 Recommendations for change .................................................................... 20 
E The Independent Police Conduct Authority ............................................................ 24 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 24 
2 Current IPCA accountability .................................................................... 24 
3 Recommendations for change .................................................................... 26 
F The Media ................................................................................................................... 29 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 29 
2 Current media accountability .................................................................... 29 
3 Improvements to media accountability .................................................... 31 
G A Prosecutorial Review Authority ............................................................................ 32 
V Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 35 
VIII Works Cited ................................................................................................................ 37 
 
 
 
  
1  
 
I Introduction 
 
Police have a unique role to play in our democratic system. On the one hand, their 
criminal investigations must be absolutely free of political influences. Yet on the other, 
they must not become the law unto themselves.1 
 
The New Zealand Police play a vital role in ensuring the effective investigation and 
prosecution of sexual offending. They are the public face of the criminal justice system and 
their handling of sexual offence complaints has the ability to either empower or re-
victimise complainants. The recent Roast Busters group and related sexual offence 
complaints highlighted serious flaws in the police processes used in that case. These were 
exposed by the Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA). The investigation showed 
that the police failed both to adequately investigate the multiple complaints made against 
the group and to consider multiple opportunities to prosecute. 
 
The findings of the IPCA cause concern regarding the conduct of police in other sexual 
violence cases and the processes used by police to investigate and decide whether 
prosecution should be pursued. Complaint rates for sexual offending are very low and the 
logical colliery of this is that complaints against police conduct in relation to sexual offence 
allegations will also be low. The likely result is that unacceptable processes and conduct 
of the police are going unnoticed, as the Roast Busters’ case revealed. This requires an 
examination of police accountability in relation to both the investigation and prosecution 
of sexual offending is therefore necessary. 
 
Police accountability is limited by the important principle of police independence. Police 
independence means that for operational decisions, including the investigation and 
prosecution of offences, police are not accountable to their minister or the executive. The 
only external mechanism holding the police to account is the IPCA, who have strong 
investigative powers. Aside from the IPCA, internal investigation provides an opportunity 
to hold individual police officers to account for their decision-making. The media can be 
considered as an additional, though weak form of accountability. Its weakness comes from 
its profit-driven nature, which results in inconsistent reporting, reliant on a ‘juicy’ story.  
 
  
1 Kent Roach “The Overview: Four Models of Police-Government Relations” in Maragaret E Beare and 
Tonita Murray (ed) Police and Government Relations: Who’s Calling the Shots? (University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto, 2007) 1 at 18. 
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I will conclude in this paper that police accountability is limited and can be increased by a 
number of improvements. Most significantly, I recommend that the courts assume more 
responsibility in holding police to account for prosecutorial decisions, particularly in 
relation to decisions not to prosecute. I further recommend that the IPCA should be given 
more power to investigate of its own authority, which would allow it to conduct larger scale 
inquiries and transform the body into more than a complaints mechanism.  A prosecutorial 
review authority is considered as an alternative, although I conclude that such a significant 
addition may not fit well into New Zealand’s administrative structure. 
 
In order to reach this conclusion, the current situation in relation to sexual offence 
complainants and their experience with the police investigation and prosecution process is 
examined. Consideration is given to the Roast Busters’ inquiry and other examples to 
illustrate the essential role of police in ensuring the correct treatment of sexual violence 
claims. I then turn to the principle of police independence and the balance which must be 
reached between independence and accountability to ensure effective and acceptable 
conduct and decision-making.  
 
Bovens’ framework of accountability is employed in the paper to define and assess the 
effectiveness of the accountability mechanisms that the New Zealand Police are held to. 
Some of the mechanisms currently do not provide accountability or provide ineffective 
accountability. Improvements are examined regarding each mechanism and in relation to 
accountability for both the investigation of offending and the decision whether or not to 
prosecute.  
 
I will address improvements that could be made to internal investigation procedures. 
Ministerial accountability will then be examined, which provides no official accountability, 
though can provide it informally in practice. I will then turn to the potential for 
accountability to the courts for prosecutorial decisions through the judicial review 
mechanism, which has traditionally been refused by the courts for policy reasons. Potential 
changes to the IPCA are examined including allowing them to investigate of their own 
motion and create binding decisions. The media will be examined as an accountability 
mechanism although I find that it provides weak accountability, with little prospect of 
significant improvement. Finally the paper will examine the potential of a prosecutorial 
review authority before reaching conclusions regarding the most appropriate mechanisms 
for change.  
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II Police Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offending 
A Introduction 
 
It is important that effective accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure police are 
accountable for their actions and seek to improve their practices. The recent example of the 
Roast Busters demonstrates the failings of police in the investigation and prosecution of 
sexual offending. The IPCA’s investigation and report of the incident will first be analysed 
to identify the key problems with police processes. This helps to illustrate the importance 
of effective handling of complaints by police, both at the investigative stage and at the stage 
where a decision is made regarding whether a prosecution will be initiated.  
B The Roast Busters Investigation 
 
In 2013, the news media drew attention to a group of young men in Auckland, who referred 
to themselves as the ‘Roast Busters’, and reported stories of their sexual activities which 
prompted wide spread public concern.2 This led to a joint inquiry by the New Zealand 
Police and Child, Youth and Family and a consequential investigation by the IPCA into the 
adequacy of the police investigation and handling of complaints made against the group. 
The investigation identified seven different cases where the activities of the group were 
brought to the attention of police, either by complaint or other means.3 No prosecutions 
resulted for a number of reasons. In some cases, officers recommended that no further 
action be taken, based on their decisions that there was insufficient evidence to lay charges. 
In others cases files were inactivated for no given reason and some of the young women 
were not prepared to give formal statements.4 On more than one occasion, police failed to 
take action in response to allegations which required further inquiries and no explanation 
was provided for this.5 A lack of explanation demonstrates itself a deficiency in police 
accountability.  
 
The IPCA addressed both the investigation by police and the decision not to prosecute. In 
relation to the investigation, they stated that the process was hampered where there was no 
  
2 “Report on Police’s Handling of the Alleged Offending by the ‘Roast Busters’” (Investigative report by the 
Independent Police Conduct Authority, March 2015) at 5. 
3 One case was reported to Police by Child, Youth and Family and a second was drawn to the attention of 
Police due an unrelated incident. At 8, 10.  
4 At 9, 10. 
5 At 9. 
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cooperation from the young women. However, due to their young age, police policy 
required that all reports of child abuse be thoroughly investigated even if the child or young 
person recants.6 The IPCA found that the “failure to undertake basic investigative tasks 
resulted in a lack of sound and evidence-based decision-making in each case.”7 The failure 
of police to conduct basic inquiries to determine the young men’s history with police meant 
that they did not link the cases together or identify that the incidents presented a common 
theme.8 Further findings of the IPCA were that there was a failure to obtain statements 
from witnesses, to attempt to speak to the young men involved, to adequately consider 
evidence or secure further evidence such as CCTV footage.9 One suspect interview was 
undertaken in relation to one case, although the IPCA found that the preparation for, and 
the standard of, the interviews was unsatisfactory at this critical phase of the 
investigation.10 
 
In relation to prosecution, the IPCA considered whether this was evaluated properly in 
relation to all available offences. The IPCA found that the young men were alleged to have 
committed offences such as sexual violation by rape and unlawful sexual connection, 
attempted rape, and assault with intent to commit sexual violation.11 At issue was whether 
the victim consented to the sexual connection which was clearly a relevant consideration, 
given the influence of alcohol on the women during some of the incidents investigated. The 
IPCA reported that the issue of capacity to consent was never adequately investigated by 
police and in some instances was not even considered.12 The other issue not adequately 
considered was the fact that the young women were under 16.13 This did not require a 
determination of whether there was consent, only whether a sexual connection occurred 
and if the complainant was under 16. Despite the two men also being under 16, the IPCA 
noted that there were a number of aggravating factors that should have prompted 
consideration of prosecution.14 These factors included that in some of the cases the young 
women were two or three years younger than the men and were vulnerable due to 
intoxication. Further, “the extent to which they were willing parties was at best equivocal” 
  
6 “Report on Police’s Handling of the Alleged Offending by the ‘Roast Busters’”, above n 2, at 15. 
7 At 15. 
8 At 15. 
9 At 16.  
10 At 16. 
11 At 22. 
12 At 22. 
13 At 23. 
14 At 23. 
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and they were subject to sexual acts by more than one man.15 They concluded that police 
staff “did not properly evaluate all available offences when determining the outcome of 
their respective investigations”.16  
 
The importance of careful and thorough handling of sexual assault allegations is 
demonstrated by this case study. In only one case was the investigation by police sufficient 
to make prosecution a “realistic consideration.”17 In this case, the young woman (aged 13) 
made a preliminary statement to police and participated in a formal evidential interview. 
Failure by police officers to adequately assess the evidence and refer the matter for a legal 
opinion, meant prosecution was not considered where it should have been.18 The young 
woman is now unwilling to be involved in a prosecution, which is likely to be a result of 
the way her complaint was handled by police.19 
C Police Handling of a Sexual Assault Allegation 
 
In November 2012, a woman told police she had been sexually assaulted by a security 
guard at a hospital when she was a patient, although the police took very little action in 
relation to the allegation.20 At the time of the sexual assault, the woman was being treated 
for self-harm injuries and was suffering from severe mental illness and this coloured the 
actions of police following the allegations made by the woman.21 Limited inquiries were 
made of hospital staff and the security guard and no further questions were asked of the 
victim.22 The police admitted during the IPCA investigation that further investigation into 
the complaint would have only taken place following additional evidence supporting the 
allegation.23 They stated that she had lost credibility in the years police had dealt with her.24 
A police investigation into the complaint was therefore not commenced. Eight months later, 
the same guard was arrested for an unrelated sexual assault and once the link was made to 
the original complaint, was charged with sexually assaulting the woman. 
  
15 “Report on Police’s Handling of the Alleged Offending by the ‘Roast Busters’”, above n 2, at 23. 
16 At 24. 
17 At 23. 
18 At 22. 
19 At 22. 
20 “Police Handling of a Sexual Assault Allegation” (Investigative report by the Independent Police Conduct 
Authority, February 2015). 
21 At 3. 
22 At 3. 
23 At 3.  
24 At 3. 
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The IPCA found that the officers involved did not comply with police policy in relation to 
sexual assault allegations, by failing to sufficiently inquire with witnesses to determine 
what further action was required.25 They also failed to ensure the complaint was handled 
and investigated appropriately, to the required standard.26 Further, the IPCA found that the 
police unfairly predetermined the outcome of the complaint based on her history and nature 
of contact with police.27 This case again demonstrates inadequate and unacceptable 
conduct on the part of police in relation to a sexual violence complaint and reinforces the 
importance of accountability. If it were not for the defendant being accused of another 
sexual assault, this conduct would have gone undiscovered. 
D Sexual Assault Generally 
 
Police response to rape may be the most crucial link in the chain to ensure fair 
treatment of rape victims. The police officer is the first representative of the criminal 
justice system the reporting victim encounters; the quality of her contact with the 
police officer may color her perception of the entire prosecution process.28 
 
The police are the public face of the criminal justice system and act as ‘gatekeepers’ for 
victim access to the system.29 “Sexual violence is the most severe and traumatic crime that 
can be inflicted on a person whether adult or child…it is a crime capable of inflicting harm 
on an individual’s essential sense of being.”30 The impact of reporting sexual violence to 
the police can be damaging and there is a strong chance of police re-victimisation.31 
 
There is a multitude of challenges relating to sexual violence complaints made to police. 
Police officers and prosecutors over-estimate the amount of false allegations made, leading 
  
25 “Police Handling of a Sexual Assault Allegation”, above n 20, at 8. 
26 At 8. 
27 At 9. 
28 Lynne Goodstein and Faith Lutze “Rape and Criminal Justice System Responses” in Imogene Moyer (ed) 
The Changing Roles of Women in the Criminal Justice System: Offenders, Victims and Professionals 
(Waveland Press, Illinois, 1992) at 169. 
29 Caroline Taylor and Leigh Gassner “Stemming the Flow: Challenges for Policing Adult Sexual Assault 
with Regard to Attrition Rates and Under-Reporting of Sexual Offences” (2009) 11 Police Practice and 
Research 240 at 240. 
30 At 241. 
31 Jan Jordan “True “Lies” and False “Truths”: Women, Rape and the Police” (Doctor of Philosophy in 
Criminology Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2001) at 75. 
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to a sceptical attitude and a lack of confidence between complainants and the police.32 
Complainants are often discouraged by early police assessments as to the difficulties of 
prosecution and research has explained this with evidence of poor investigation and 
understanding of the law by police, and a tendency to emphasis discrediting features.33 If 
the police response is perceived negatively by the complainant, it will make it less likely 
that he or she will proceed with legal action and may deter others from making initial police 
contact.34 In many countries where studies have been conducted, reported rape offences 
have increased in the last two decades, yet prosecutions for rape have failed to increase 
proportionally.35 A New Zealand study, conducted in 1998, found that half of sexual assault 
complainants surveyed expressed dissatisfaction with the police, especially in relation to 
insensitive and disbelieving attitudes.36 
 
Research in this area illustrates the importance of appropriate police responses and 
investigations of sexual violence complaints. Accountability is important in ensuring that 
police are held to a high standard of conduct in relation to investigations and prosecution 
of such complaints. There are mechanisms in place that hold the police accountable to some 
extent, although questions remain as to whether these mechanisms are adequate. 
 
III The Principle of Police Independence 
 
In New Zealand, the political independence of police is extensive and regarded as 
important. However, there is also recognition that independence must be accompanied by 
strong and effective accountability mechanisms.37 The New Zealand Police are regarded 
as an “instrument of the Crown”, although not a government agency or department, 
creating some uncertainty as to the status of police officers.38 The police are led by the 
Commissioner of Police, appointed by the Governor-General for a term not exceeding five 
years.39 A fundamental characteristic of the New Zealand Police and the Commissioner is 
  
32 Liz Kelly, Jo Lovett and Linda Regan “A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape Cases” (February 
2005) Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate at xii. 
33 At xii. 
34 Jordan, above n 31, at 75. 
35 Jo Lovett and Liz Kelly “Different Systems, Similar Outcomes? Tracking Attrition in Reported Rape Cases 
Across Europe” (Child and Women Abuse Studies Unit, London, 2009) at 5. 
36 Jordan, above n 31, at 80. 
37 Philip Stenning “Origins of the Concept of Police Independence” (2011) 13 FLJ 241 at 241. 
38 Policing Act 2008, s 7, Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, 
Brookers, Wellington, 2014) at 255. 
39 Policing Act, s 12. 
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their independence from the Crown and the Commissioner is therefore not responsible to, 
and must act independently of, any Minister of the Crown in relation to certain matters.40 
This is codified in Section 16 of the Policing Act 2008.41 
 
Section 16 Responsibilities and independence of Commissioner 
 
(1) The Commissioner is responsible to the Minister for— 
(a) carrying out the functions and duties of the Police; and 
(b) the general conduct of the Police; and 
(c) the effective, efficient, and economical management of the Police; and 
(d) tendering advice to the Minister and other Ministers of the Crown; and 
(e) giving effect to any lawful ministerial directions. 
 
(2) The Commissioner is not responsible to, and must act independently of, any 
Minister of the Crown (including any person acting on the instruction of a Minister 
of the Crown) regarding— 
(a) the maintenance of order in relation to any individual or group of individuals; 
and 
(b) the enforcement of the law in relation to any individual or group of individuals; 
and 
(c) the investigation and prosecution of offences; and 
(d) decisions about individual Police employees 
 
The changes delivered by the Policing Act 2008, which replaced the Police Act 1958, 
endorsed the approach of Lord Denning in ex-parte Blackburn, defining the independence 
of police in relation to operational aspects of their role.42 The Policing Act codified the 
concept of police independence for the first time in New Zealand, although a lack of clarity 
remains regarding what may be defined within section 16(2) of the Act.  
 
The doctrine of police independence has historically existed only in certain common law 
jurisdictions, with no clear constitutional or statutory basis.43 The doctrine arose in 
response to radical reforms to Parliament in the nineteenth century in the United Kingdom, 
  
40 Section 16. 
41 Section 16. 
42 Police Act 1958. 
43 Philip Stenning “The Idea of the ‘Political Independence’ of the Police: International Interpretations and 
Experiences” in Maragaret E Beare and Tonita Murray (ed) Police and Government Relations: Who’s Calling 
the Shots? (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 183 at 188. 
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which meant that the police were no longer governed by the Judiciary.44 These reforms 
coincided with the police becoming increasingly subject to political governance and 
accountability.45 In response to this increasing authority and accountability, the concept of 
police independence emerged. The modern doctrine of police independence is generally 
quoted from ex parte Blackburn. Lord Denning stated:46 
 
No Minister of the Crown can tell him that he must, or must not, keep observation on 
this place or that; or that he must, or must not, prosecute this man or that one. Nor can 
any police authority tell him so. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. 
He is answerable to the law and to the law alone. 
 
The case of Blackburn addressed the question of the legal relationship between the 
government and a police officer and whether the relationship was one of “master and 
servant” within the law of torts.47 The courts concluded that they were not a ‘servant’ for 
this purpose and this was subsequently cited as the basis for the doctrine of police 
independence.  This citation is often criticised as not being doctrinally sound, due to the 
specific context in which the decision was made.48 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada held in 1999 in the case of R v Campbell that police are 
independent of the control of the executive government and this principle underpins the 
rule of law.49 Commonwealth countries have accepted differing interpretations of the 
concept of police independence, exhibiting differing levels of independence from political 
accountability and control. Australia is reluctant to recognise a wide range of decision 
making which should be made by the police independently. Similarly, the United Kingdom 
appears to be seeking to narrow the concept of police independence to ensure that it does 
not imply increased immunity from accountability, direction and control.50 
 
 
  
44 Stenning, above n 37, at 249. 
45 At 249. 
46 R v Metropolitan Police ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 116 at 135-136. 
47 Stenning, above n 43, at 191. 
48 At 191. 
49 R v Campbell 1999 1 SCR 565. 
50 Stenning, above n 37, at 206, 241. 
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IV Defining and Analysing Accountability  
A Background 
 
The police response to complaints of sexual violence is of great importance in ensuring 
that a complaint may proceed where possible to a successful prosecution of a perpetrator 
of violence. Effective responses and decision making by police is important both at the 
investigation stage and when the decision is made regarding whether a prosecution will 
commence. The Roast Busters investigation exposed a significant failing within the police 
to effectively respond to sexual violence. Due to the sensitive and confidential nature of 
these crimes, it is unclear where other police failings may lie. Police independence remains 
an important principle of our democracy, although the principle of accountability is equally 
important and cannot be discounted. Accountability serves the purpose of both exposing 
these failings and providing incentives for the police to maintain the high standard of 
conduct which the public demands. Finding the balance between these two principles is 
difficult, as it may result in either an accountability deficit or an accountability overload, 
which have the ability to produce equally negative effects. 
 
This section of the paper will ask how the police are held to account for prosecution 
decisions, using Bovens’ framework of accountability to assess whether police 
accountability mechanisms exist and how effective they are. First, the internal investigation 
mechanisms is assessed and improvements identified. I then turn to look at ministerial 
accountability, which does not play an official role currently in police accountability for 
operational decisions. Despite the lack of an official accountability relationship, the 
Minister of Police does have informal accountability power. I then turn to the courts, which 
do not play a key role in police accountability for prosecutorial decisions currently. The 
IPCA is then addressed, which provides the most important form of external accountability 
for the police, although weaknesses in its current form could be addressed to make it 
stronger. I then turn to look at the media as a form of accountability and find that it is a 
weak and unreliable form of accountability with no prospect of significant improvement. 
Finally, I consider a prosecutorial review commission as an addition to the constitutional 
framework to ensure independent oversight over prosecutorial decisions made by all 
government departments.  
 
Bovens provides a clear analytical and evaluative framework for the assessment of 
accountability, in terms of whether accountability exists and assessing mechanisms 
11  
 
systematically. He defines and assesses accountability in a tangible way which is applicable 
to many situations, including the focus of this paper. He defines accountability as:51 
 
 A relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to 
explain and to justify his conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, 
and the actors may face consequences. 
 
Bovens’ clarifies the final requirement of ‘consequences’, as there is academic debate 
regarding whether an accountability mechanism requires the ability of the forum to 
sanction the actor. He asserts that the possibility of sanctions “makes the difference 
between the non-committal provision of information and being held to account.”52 Other 
academics suggest that answerability without sanctions can still be accountability, albeit 
‘weak accountability’.53 Brinkerhoff argues that sanctions can be thought of more broadly, 
and “may include an array of incentives that are intended to reward good behaviour and 
action and deter bad behaviour and action.”54 Conversely, he states that sanctions are 
“intimately connected to democratic governance” and without enforceability, 
accountability is significantly diminished.55 Bovens determines a middle ground, requiring 
consequences. Consequences can include formal and legalised penalties and disciplinary 
action, while also acknowledging that unwritten rules, such as the convention requiring 
minister resignation, can be regarded as consequences.56  
 
Bovens identifies three perspectives from which accountability relations should be 
assessed. The democratic perspective is grounded in the idea of accountability as an 
essential condition of democracy. Public organisations are tasked with spending taxpayer 
money and using their discretion and are held to account through an agent-principle 
chain.57 At the end of that chain are citizens, who are tasked with passing judgement on the 
  
51 Mark Bovens “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework” (2007) 13 ELJ 447 at 
450. 
52 Bovens, above n 51, at 451. 
53 Derick Brinkerhoff “Taking Account of Accountability: A Conceptual Overview and Strategic Options” 
(paper presented to the U.S. Agency for International Development Center for Democracy and Governance 
Implementing Policy Change Project, March 2001) at 2. 
54 At 3. 
55 At 3. 
56 Bovens, above n 51, at 452. 
57 At 465. 
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conduct of the government.58 The effectiveness of an accountability arrangement from this 
perspective can be assessed by asking:59 
 
Do these accountability arrangements help to provide political principals with 
sufficient information about the behaviour of their agents and do they offer enough 
incentives to agents to commit themselves to the agendas of their democratically 
elected principals? 
 
The constitutional perspective is grounded in the idea that accountability helps to prevent 
the tyranny of absolute rulers and elected leaders and expansive and privatised executive 
power, as “good governance arises from a dynamic equilibrium between the various 
powers of the state”.60 The question to be asked from this perspective is:61 
 
Does the accountability forum have enough inquisitive power to reveal corruption or 
mismanagement; are the available sanctions strong enough to have preventative side 
effects? 
 
Finally, the learning perspective is grounded in the idea of accountability to induce learning 
within the executive branch. Accountability should provide a regular mechanism to 
“confront administrators with information about their own functioning and force them to 
reflect on the successes and failures of their past policy”.62 This allows them to increase 
their own effectiveness and efficiency to achieve desirable social outcomes. The question 
to determine the effectiveness of accountability from this perspective is:63 
 
Do the accountability arrangements offer sufficient feedback, but also the right 
incentives to officials and agencies to reflect upon their policies and procedures and 
to improve upon them?  
 
Boven’s framework provides an opportunity to examine what mechanisms can be defined 
as police accountability, using a clear and applicable definition. His perspectives allow the 
relevant accountability mechanisms to be assessed and categorised, to identify where 
among the perspectives there may be a significant deficiency or overload of accountability. 
  
58 At 463. 
59 At 465. 
60 Bovens, above n 51, at 463. 
61 At 465. 
62 At 464. 
63 At 466. 
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Many mechanisms play a role from more than one perspective and it is important to identify 
where multiple roles are present, in order to accurately assess whether the combination of 
accountability is adequate. I will now apply Bovens’ framework to the key accountability 
mechanisms by which the New Zealand Police are held to account, assessing whether each 
institution can be defined as accountability, from what perspective and where 
improvements can be made.  
B Internal Investigation  
1 Introduction 
 
Internal investigation is arguably the most important mechanism for holding individual 
police officers and groups of officers to account for their actions as they deal with all 
matters which occur internally within the police organisation. It is therefore important that 
the police have robust accountability mechanisms and processes within the leadership 
hierarchy and the organisation. Currently, the complaints process within the police is 
closely linked to the IPCA. The process is, for the most part, kept behind closed doors 
which raises questions about its effectiveness.  
2 Current internal investigation processes 
 
When a complaint is made to the police or the IPCA, each body will notify the other as to 
the nature of the complaint. The IPCA will then be responsible for classifying each 
complaint under one of five categories, in order to determine the correct cause of action.64 
The first category requires a police investigator to be responsible for the investigation, with 
regular contact and oversight from the IPCA.65 The second category requires both regular 
contact with the IPCA and the submission of the investigation report to the IPCA following 
the investigation for review.66 The third category regards the situation where the 
investigation is completed by the police alone without any IPCA involvement.67 Category 
four refers to the situation where conciliation is considered appropriate and there is no need 
for formal investigation, instead focusing on early engagement and negotiation with the 
affected parties.68 The final category relates to the situation where the complaint has been 
  
64 Letter from Superintendent M Johnson (National Manager, Police Prosecution Service) to Laura Neale 
(Author) regarding police complaint processes (28 August 2015). 
65 Johnson, above n 64. 
66 Independent Police Conduct Authority Act 1988, s 20(1).  
67 Johnson, above n 64. 
68 Johnson, above n 64. 
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declined by the IPCA and is forwarded to the police to complete a review of the complaint 
and decide on the appropriate course of action.69  
 
The Commissioner of Police is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of 
offences and decisions about individual police employees, independently of the Minister 
of Police.70 As will be discussed, the rationale for this independence is to ensure that police 
“act only in the broad public interest, rather than in partisan, political, corporate or personal 
interests”.71 This makes internal investigation important, as the chain of accountability 
ends with the Commissioner. The internal investigation process is headed by the 
Commissioner, although practical responsibility lies with the District Commander of the 
area where the complaint is made.72  
 
The internal investigation process is set out in internal ‘General Instructions’, which are 
issued by the Commissioner of Police.73 The District Commander will oversee the 
investigation of the complaint and will appoint an appropriate staff member to conduct the 
investigation.74 In the situation where the District Commander considers the allegation 
“trivial, frivolous, vexatious or not in good faith”, they may suspend the investigation.75 If 
that investigation is suspended a report must be sent to the IPCA, providing accountability 
for the decision to dismiss a complaint.76  
 
A Commission of Inquiry was conducted between 2004 and 2007 to investigate the way in 
which sexual assault allegations were dealt with by the police. A report was released in 
2007 by the Commission and included an analysis of the internal investigation process for 
complaints. 77 The report raised concerns of a lack of public awareness regarding both the 
right to complain and the rights of a complainant. Today, the New Zealand Police website 
provides comprehensive information in multiple languages regarding the different options 
  
69 Johnson, above n 64. 
70 Policing Act, s 16. 
71 Philip Stenning “Governance of the Police: Independence, Accountability and Interference” (2011) 13 FLJ 
241 at 251. 
72 Dame Margaret Bazley “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Police Conduct: Volume 1” 
(Commission of Inquiry into Police Conduct, Wellington, March 2007) at 55. 
73 Policing Act, s 28. 
74 Bazley, above n 72, at 58. 
75 At 58. 
76 At 58. 
77 At 1.  
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for making a complaint to police, including information about the IPCA.78 Despite this, it 
is important to remember the small proportion of sexual violence complaints reported to 
the police and the logical colliery that this will translate into a small proportion of 
complaints made about police. This remains a concern and publicity of the complaints 
mechanism should continue to be promoted.  
 
The police will, on occasion, release internal investigation documents and reviews which 
they deem to be “of public interest”.79 These are made available to the public through the 
New Zealand Police website. Due to the intense media scrutiny at the time, the police 
released the ‘Redacted Investigation Overview Report’ regarding the multi-unit 
investigation into the Roast Busters group. At the time, the police stated that they had taken 
“the rare step of releasing the report to provide transparency and assist the public in 
understanding the complexities involved”.80 
 
The internal investigation mechanism can be defined as a relationship between an actor, 
being the police employee or police as an organisation, and a forum being the 
Commissioner of Police. The actor will have an informal obligation, through the course of 
their employment, to explain and justify their conduct and respond to questions from the 
investigator. The question of consequences can be answered by the possibility of 
termination of individual employment, or demotion, depending on the outcome of the 
investigation. In terms of Bovens’ definition, this mechanism can be defined as 
accountability.  
 
Internal investigation can hold the police democratically accountable when reports are 
released publicly. This allows police to remain directly accountable to the taxpayer while 
avoiding political interference, though reports are rarely released. Within the police 
organisation, the democratic perspective may also be relevant, as it provides the 
Commissioner as the political principal with information regarding the conduct of 
individual employees. The investigation process provides an incentive for employees to act 
in accordance with the law and their duty. Internal investigation also has the ability to hold 
individual police officers constitutionally accountable, as it can reveal corruption and 
mismanagement. The sanction of an employee or employees losing their job due to 
corruption or mismanagement is a powerful one, though requires detection and complaint 
by another person, whether a staff member or a member of the public. If such corruption 
  
78 “Praise and Complain” New Zealand Police <police.govt.nz>. 
79 “Investigations and reviews” New Zealand Police <police.govt.nz>. 
80 “Operation Clover- Investigation Overview” (October 2014) New Zealand Police <police.govt.nz>. 
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or mismanagement is occurring at a high level it may be difficult to detect, therefore 
creating potential for it to continue. 
3 Recommendations for change 
 
Current processes used to respond to complaints appear robust, given the involvement of 
the IPCA which ultimately makes the decision regarding the way in which a complaint 
should be dealt with. They have the ability to request oversight and play a key role in the 
dismissal of frivolous or vexatious complaints. The interaction between these two bodies 
ensures that police remain accountable in the way they respond to complaints.  
 
The strength of this mechanism is limited by the lack of transparency and public availability 
of complaints which makes it difficult to assess how effective the process is. Internal 
investigation procedures could strengthen the democratic accountability of the police by 
requiring more investigation reports be published. This would allow the police to be held 
directly accountable to the public more often and ensure that the standard of handling 
complaints is of a high level. There are obvious sensitivities associated with publishing 
public reports, relating to privacy and victim identification. Official Information Requests 
have been rejected on these grounds, citing the significant amount of personal information 
contained in investigation reports.81 This can be managed in the same way it is managed 
by the IPCA, by removing names and identifying details. The benefit of publishing reports 
publicly more often could be significant, as it would ensure that the standard of professional 
behaviour on the part of police was higher given the increased accountability they would 
face. More frequent publishing of reports would also ensure the standard of investigation, 
as it would be of a standard that the public would find acceptable. Currently, it is impossible 
to verify the quality of reports, as they are not released to the public. It is reasonable to 
expect that all reports would, notwithstanding public release, be of a quality that the public 
would find acceptable. This change in policy would ensure this is always the case.  
C Ministerial Accountability  
1 Introduction 
 
Ministerial accountability of the police is limited by the principal of police independence.  
This independence means that in relation to operational decisions, the police will not be 
accountable to the Minister for Police. This is codified in legislation, specifically in the 
  
81 Letter from Superintendent M Johnson, above n 64.  
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Policing Act 2008.82 The Minister can therefore not be described as an official 
accountability mechanism in relation to investigation and prosecutorial decisions, as this is 
excluded from their role as Minister for Police. In practice, the Minister is involved and 
informed about all issues of policing, creating a conflict with the principle of police 
independence. 
2 Current ministerial accountability 
 
In practice, the relationship between the Commissioner and the Minister is one of ‘no 
surprises’, which involves the Minister being informed of issues as they arise, regular 
phone contact and weekly meetings.83 A recent report noted that “police seek regular verbal 
feedback from the Minister and her staff on the service police are providing.”84 In the 
report, no distinction is provided between operational and policy decisions and it seems 
that in general, police will report to the Minister on matters of either classification.  
 
This is exemplified by the response of the Minister of Police at the time, the Honourable 
Anne Tolley, to the Roast Busters saga. When media attention became fixed on the group, 
she asked for the facts from the Commissioner of Police and was told that no complaint 
had been made against the Roast Busters.85 Upon learning that a complaint had in fact been 
made, she stated to the media that not being given accurate information was “unacceptable” 
and she wrote to the IPCA, requesting a formal inquiry be conducted.86 The issue arose 
again recently, with the Honourable Michael Woodhouse recently commenting on the 
Roast Busters’ investigation and IPCA report. He stated, “I have received assurance from 
Commissioner Bush that the steps that are required to be taken to ensure that this doesn’t 
happen again are being taken, and I will continue to monitor those reports.”87  
 
This suggests that the police are expected to report to the Minister on operational matters, 
due to the role that ministers have as the public figurehead of the organisations they are 
responsible for. As identified by Pitman and Pitman, if the police get it wrong, “it is 
  
82 Policing Act, s 16. 
83 “Formal Review of the New Zealand Police” (State Services Commission, the Treasury and the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, September 2012) at 60. 
84 At 60. 
85 Simon Wong and Kate Harley “Minister Orders Roast Busters Inquiry” (7 November 2013) TV3 News 
<www.3news.co.nz>. 
86 Above, n 85. 
87 Nikki Papatsoumas “IPCA: Police ‘let down’ Roast Busters’ alleged victims” The New Zealand Herald 
(online ed, Auckland, 19 March 2015). 
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eventually the minister’s neck that is put squarely on the chopping block” and it is the 
minister who must account to Parliament and the people for the actions of the police.88 Part 
of the problem is that the majority of the public is probably unaware that unlike all other 
Ministers, the Minister of Police does not provide an accountability mechanism for his or 
her organisation. In effect this means that the police and the Commissioner of Police are 
accountable to the Minister, due to the accountability which the Minister has to the public. 
From a practical perspective, the Minister is being briefed on both policy and operational 
matters, has the ability to monitor progress and in all probability has some influence over 
the actions of the police. This is what the independence principle seeks to avoid and is 
arguably a breach of legislation. 
3 Recommendations for change 
 
Accountability of the police to the Minister in relation to operational decisions is legislated 
against, due to the importance of upholding police independence. In practice, the Minister 
does have an accountability function in relation to particular cases that are likely to attract 
media attention. It is unclear how far reaching this accountability is where media attention 
is not likely. It could be argued that due to this accountability role and the fact that the 
public, through the media holds the police to account, a more official accountability 
relationship is appropriate. This would have wide reaching implications in relation to the 
principle of police independence that plays an important role in minimising the risk of 
corruption and undue political influence on the police in relation to operational decisions.  
 
It is difficult to assess how wide reaching the Minister’s role is in relation to accountability, 
due to the privacy of meetings with police. According to the State Services Commission 
report, the working relationship between the police and the Minister is positive and working 
well.89 Although this relationship does raise questions about legality, I submit that this 
unofficial ‘no secrets’ approach is important in practice due to the Minister’s accountability 
to the public. The Minister and the Commissioner of Police must continue their working 
relationship with caution, as the principle exists for an important purpose and is legislated 
for, for that reason. 
  
88 Brian Pitman and Grant Pitman “Can Our Police Commissioners Cope” (1997) 2 Themis: The Journal for 
Justice 23 at 25. 
89 State Services Commission, above n 83, at 60. 
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D Courts 
1 Introduction 
 
Accountability to the courts for prosecutorial decisions is extremely limited, to the point 
that it cannot be defined as a mechanism for holding the police to account. This is due to 
common law doctrine which means that the courts will only interfere in prosecutorial 
decisions in extreme cases. Changes in other common law jurisdictions suggest that the 
courts could provide an accountability mechanism in relation to decisions made not to 
prosecute. Allowing the courts to judicially review these decisions would not unjustifiably 
interfere with government discretion.  
2 Current court accountability 
 
Traditionally, the courts have shown reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the 
discretion to prosecute. Some cases have said that such powers are not reviewable at all.90 
Case law indicates that there are many policy reasons for this reluctance. The discretion to 
prosecute on behalf of the state is regarded as a function of the executive rather than the 
courts, recognising the governmental interest and community expectation in justice being 
done.91 Further, the decision is said to involve a “high content of judgment and discretion” 
and there is concern regarding “constitutional sensitivities” given the court’s own 
responsibilities for the conduct of criminal trials.92 Another consideration is that allowing 
challenges to this decision, outside of the trial and appeal process, would disrupt the 
criminal justice system. It is commonly argued that a better avenue to deal with abuse of 
decision making discretion is the court’s inherent power to dismiss or stay a prosecution 
for abuse of process. However, the use of this judicial power is likely to only be used where 
conduct is in bad faith or there is an improper motive for bringing the prosecution and “is 
an extreme step which is to be taken only in the clearest of cases”, making it of limited 
use.93 There are no recent cases where a stay of proceedings has been ordered due to a 
prosecution initiated for an improper purpose, raising questions about how far this power 
can go to protect adequate prosecutorial decision making.94 Additional reasons given by 
the court for their lack of intervention include that the conclusion by an authority that an 
  
90 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne [2005] NZAR 408, R v Sloan [1990] 1 NZLR 474 at 478. 
91 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 80, at [61]. 
92 Fox v Attorney General [2002] 3 NZLR 62 (CA) at [31]. 
93 At [37]. 
94 John Spencer “Review of Public Prosecution Services” (September 2011) Crown Law 
<www.crownlaw.govt.nz> at 63. 
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offence has been committed is an expression of opinion which can be challenged in court, 
as can factual errors.95 It is also possible for the courts to address the issue after conviction, 
through the ability to discharge a defendant without conviction.  
 
The case of Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne addressed the discretionary nature of the 
decision to prosecute. The case concerned an investigation which took place following the 
death of a bather at the Polynesian Spa.96 A report recommending that prosecution be 
brought against Polynesian Spa Limited for breach of the Health and Safety in Employment 
Act was issued and the company applied for judicial review.97 The Judge held that it will 
only be in rare cases that a judicial review challenge of this nature will be successful, due 
to “substantial policy and constitutional reasons” discouraging the courts from interfering 
with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.98 This indicates that in all but the most 
extreme cases, the court will not act as an accountability mechanism to review decisions 
made in regard to prosecutions. 
 
Although the case has opened the door to judicial review in the case of prosecutorial 
decision making, practically doing so remained unlikely. Russell and Dunne note that the 
court will be very hesitant to disturb a prosecutorial decision and “unwilling to substitute 
its own decision for that of a prosecutor unless the charges have been laid in bad faith or 
for a collateral purpose”.99 In practice, judicial review remains unattainable in the case of 
the decision to or not to prosecute and there has never been a successful judicial review of 
such a decision.100 
3 Recommendations for change 
 
Judicial review could be used to ensure accountability for prosecutorial decisions. In 
particular, the decision not to prosecute could benefit from judicial intervention where the 
decision making process has been flawed. I recommend that the court be more willing to 
judicially review decisions not to prosecute, which is a development that has been seen in 
other common law jurisdictions.  
  
95 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 90, at [61]. 
96 At [2] 
97 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 90, at [3]-[4], Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, s 
16(2)(b). 
98 At [68]. 
99 Nick Russell and James Dunne “Three Strikes and You’re Out, Version 2: The New Proposed Sentencing 
and Parole Reform Bill” (5 Feb 2010) Chen Palmer <www.chenpalmer.com>. 
100 Spencer, above n 94, at 63. 
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Canada provides an example of a common law jurisdiction whose courts have been more 
willing to consider the option of judicial review for prosecutorial decisions. The Canadian 
case of Jewitt reversed a line of authority previously holding that prosecutorial decisions 
were immune from judicial review.101 It was found that the courts “cannot turn a blind eye 
to the conduct of one of the principal litigants appearing before them”.102 The Supreme 
Court of Canada has since continued to judicially review prosecutorial decisions. This has 
caused some concern from academics regarding the “unspecified relaxed standard” of 
judicial review which the courts appears to be using in these cases.103 
 
The United Kingdom is another common law jurisdiction that has taken a similar approach 
to judicially reviewing such decisions and has made an important distinction between 
decisions to prosecute, as opposed to decisions not to prosecute. The case of R v Director 
of Public Prosecutions ex parte Kebilene concerned a decision to prosecute.104 The Court 
held that where a decision was an obvious abuse of process it may be open to a defendant 
to apply for judicial review, though exceptional circumstances must be present.105 An older 
case, R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Allen held that a lower standard was 
appropriate for judicial review of the decision to prosecute.106 The case importantly 
concluded that a decision to prosecute could be amenable to judicial review if it is an 
unjustified departure from established prosecution practice. Lowering the standard further, 
the Judge decided that absent of a departure from policy or practice, if there was a breach 
of contract or representation resulting in unfairness it could result in judicial review.107 
Differing thresholds for judicial review are clear from these cases, although Kebilene seems 
to be the accepted standard, with multiple cases citing the “exceptional circumstances” 
threshold.108 
 
The courts in the United Kingdom appear more willing to accept a lower threshold in the 
case of the decision not to prosecute, which is likely due to the lack of remedies that exist 
  
101 R v Jewitt [1985] 2 SCR 128 at 131. 
102 Michael Code “Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Decisions: A Short History of Costs and Benefits, in 
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103 Code, above n 102, at 889. 
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108 The Crown Prosecution Service “Appeals: Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Decisions” (21 May 2009) 
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for such a decision. In R v DPP ex parte C, the Divisional Court found that it had the power 
to interfere with a decision not to prosecute where it could be shown that the prosecutor 
had not followed the policy set out in the United Kingdom’s ‘Code for Crown 
Prosecutors’.109 The judgment included a warning that this power should be used 
sparingly.110 It gave three situations in which the courts are able to act, namely if the 
decision was arrived at because of an unlawful policy, if the actor failed to follow settled 
policy or because the decision was perverse.111 The case of R (on the application of Peter 
Dennis) v DPP held that the prosecutor had not provided clear reasons for his decision. 
The Court in that case asserted that they will be likely to order a review of a decision not 
to prosecute where:112 
 
1 It can be demonstrated objectively that a serious point or multiple points supporting 
the prosecution have not been considered 
2 It can be demonstrated that a conclusion about the nature of some evidence 
supporting a prosecution is irrational 
3 The points are such to make it strongly arguable that the decision would be different  
 
Since that decision, the courts in the United Kingdom have continued to judicially review 
decisions made not to prosecute, though in most cases refusing the application.113 It is clear 
that the courts are more willing to consider a decision for judicial review where the 
conclusion is that prosecution will not be pursued and it raises question as to why such a 
distinction is not made in New Zealand. In a report produced by Crown Law, this concern 
was raised by a Judge who commented that the problem of under-charging was much 
greater than the problem of over-charging.114 His rationale for this suggestion was that 
there is “virtually no available remedy for improper decisions not to prosecute.”115 Many 
of the policy reasons for the court not intervening in prosecutorial decisions, are irrelevant 
to the decision not to prosecute. If the irrelevant justifications are removed, what remains 
is the highly discretionary nature of the decision and constitutional sensitivities relating to 
the courts’ own role in the trial process. With no remedies available for a failure to 
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prosecute, it is important to look at the rationales for the courts’ hesitance to intervene 
through judicial review where a decision is made not to prosecute.   
 
The first rationale relates to the highly discretionary nature of the decision. The court is 
well versed in dealing with matters of a discretionary nature and as in any case, can be 
presented with evidence from the Crown as to the matters which they considered in the 
decision. Regardless, the standard for judicial review remains high and it will only be met 
where the decision making process is improper or outside the law.116 
 
The other rationale relates to constitutional sensitivities given the role of the court in 
conducting the trial. This is less of an issue where the decision has been made not to 
prosecute, as the judicial system has not had any interaction with the individual or parties. 
Most significantly, the court is the only institution with the ability to make binding 
decisions in regard to a decision by the police not to commence prosecution. Although the 
IPCA has the ability to issue recommendations, these will not automatically result in a 
prosecution. Judicial review could provide an important avenue to allow a decision not to 
prosecute to be reviewed, to determine whether there has been an abuse of process.  
 
In my view, the courts should become more open to the possibility of judicially reviewing 
prosecutorial decisions. In particular, judicial review should be more readily available 
where decisions holding that prosecution should not be pursued are made. These decisions 
lack both strong policy justifications and alternative remedies. The high standard required 
for judicial review to be successful is enough to safeguard the process and ensure that 
prosecutorial independence in maintained. 
 
Applied to the particular case of the police and sexual offending, judicial review is the only 
option to legally challenge a decision not to prosecute. The police are limited in their 
accountability and the IPCA is currently the only external body with the power to review 
prosecutorial decisions and can only make recommendations. If the courts were to 
intervene more frequently it would provide stronger accountability and send a message that 
the court will not tolerate unacceptable processes and decision making, where prosecutorial 
decisions are concerned. 
  
116 “Introduction: What is Judicial Review” New Zealand Law Society <www.lawyerseducation.co.nz> at 2. 
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E The Independent Police Conduct Authority 
1 Introduction 
 
The IPCA, as mentioned above, is the only external body with the power to hold the police 
to account for their actions. In order to fulfil its function, the IPCA and the police have a 
close working relationship as discussed in relation to police internal investigation 
procedures. The IPCA works well as an accountability mechanism which allows the police 
to maintain their political independence, though its strength could be increased by allowing 
it to investigate of its own accord, as is recommended in this paper.  
2 Current IPCA accountability  
 
The IPCA is an independent crown entity, which was created by the Independent Police 
Conduct Authority Act 1988. The IPCA is led by a judge and consists of up to five 
members, who are selected by the Governor-General on recommendation from the House 
of Representatives.117 Broadly, it aims to “reassure the public and Parliament that policing 
standards are the highest possible.”118 The IPCA is the “only organisation outside of the 
police with responsibility for investigating and establishing whether the conduct, policies, 
practices and procedures of the police are appropriate.”119 It is therefore the only 
organisation to which the police are formally accountable for investigative and 
prosecutorial decisions. 
 
The function of the IPCA is to receive complaints alleging misconduct or neglect of duty 
by any police employee or concerning any practice, policy or procedure of the police and 
to investigate the complaint where it is in the public interest.120 The IPCA may only 
investigate of its own motion where there is a death or serious bodily injury caused by the 
police employee in the course of their duty, and there are reasonable grounds to investigate 
in the public interest.121 Upon completion of the investigation, they will form an opinion 
as to whether the subject of the investigation was “contrary to law, unreasonable, 
unjustified, unfair or undesirable.”122 That opinion will be conveyed to the Commissioner, 
  
117 Independent Police Conduct Authority Act 1988, s 5, 5A. 
118 Law and Order Committee “2013/14 Annual Review of the Independent Police Conduct Authority” 
(Report of the Law and Order Committee to Parliament, 26 March 2015) at 2. 
119 Mai Chen The Public Law Toolbox (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2012) at 827. 
120 Independent Police Conduct Authority Act, s 12.  
121 Section 12, 13. 
122 Section 27(1) 
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along with recommendations as it sees fit.123 The Commissioner must then notify the IPCA 
of actions taken to implement the recommendations and give reasons for any decision to 
depart from any recommendations.124 If the IPCA is unsatisfied with the response to the 
recommendations, they must send a copy of the opinion and recommendations to the 
Attorney General and the Minister of Police.125 Where they consider it appropriate, the 
IPCA shall provide the Attorney-General with a report on the matter for tabling in the 
House of Representatives.126  
 
Bovens’ definition of accountability requires a relationship between an actor and forum, 
which is met by the relationship between either the New Zealand Police collectively or 
individual police officers as the actor and the IPCA as the forum. The IPCA may require 
any person to provide information in relation to any matter under investigation.127 
Additionally, they may summon and examine any person to give information in relation to 
any matter under investigation.128 Further, the Commissioner of Police is required to 
provide the IPCA with all necessary information and assistance in relation to any 
investigation.129 As stated above, the IPCA will form an opinion on the subject of 
investigation and issue recommendations to the Commissioner. The IPCA has no formal 
power to enforce those recommendations, nor is it capable of prosecuting, or taking 
disciplinary action against the police itself. 
 
The IPCA has the ability to issue public reports “from time to time, in the public interest 
or in the interest of any person.”130 This will generally happen where “there is a death 
involving police, or where, in the interests of both the police and the public, circumstances 
need to be explained or a better approach suggested for the future.”131 An example of this 
is the “Report on Police’s Handling of the Alleged Offending by Roast Busters”, released 
to the public following the investigation conducted by the IPCA.132 
 
  
123 Section 27(2). 
124 Section 29(1). 
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126 Section 29(3). 
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26  
 
The IPCA would not meet the definition of accountability if strict sanctions were required. 
It has no authority to discipline members, or to force the police to make changes. However, 
it does have the power to make the actor face consequences. The recommendations which 
they are capable of making are powerful due to the legal requirement that the 
Commissioner of Police must consider and respond to them. The ability of the IPCA to 
report to Parliament if unsatisfied with the police response, is a serious political 
consequence. Additionally, the power to publish public reports may result in consequences 
demanded by the public, such as institutional change and resignations. However, a 
powerful public response to a report is only likely in the case of serious misconduct. The 
powers of the IPCA to make recommendations and report to Parliament, meets the 
requirement that the actor may face consequences. Therefore the IPCA meets Bovens’ 
definition of accountability. 
 
Although the IPCA meets the definition of accountability, the effectiveness of it as an 
accountability mechanism can be questioned. The IPCA provides an effective form of 
accountability from a constitutional perspective due to its inquisitive powers allowing it to 
reveal corruption, although this is weakened by their limited ability to investigate of their 
own motion. The IPCA has significant inquisitive power, with the ability to require any 
person to give evidence on any matter. This inquisitive power should play a role in 
revealing any corruption or mismanagement within the police. The IPCA has the ability to 
investigate without complaint in very limited circumstances, which weakens 
accountability, as there is reliance on outside parties to draw attention to a situation and 
make a complaint.  
 
The IPCA also has a role in providing education and learning, giving feedback and 
encouraging officials to reflect and improve policies and procedures. The IPCA provides 
an independent and comprehensive investigation report into wrongdoing which officials 
can use to reflect and improve on their processes and practices. Further, the IPCA can issue 
recommendations that include specific improvements that can be made to policies and 
procedures. These recommendations are not binding, though the Commissioner is legally 
required to consider them and give reasons for any departure, making them powerful and 
persuasive. 
3 Recommendations for change  
 
The IPCA is a powerful authority and the only external body with the capability to hold 
the New Zealand Police and its employees to account for their actions and decisions. The 
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IPCA is limited by two key features, namely the lack of ability to investigate of their own 
accord in the majority of cases and the fact that their recommendations cannot be made 
binding. As will be discussed, it would be beneficial for the IPCA to be able to investigate 
of their own accord. 
 
The IPCA is currently only able to investigate without complaint where there are 
reasonable grounds to carry out an investigation in the public interest any incident notified 
to them by the Commissioner, where a police employee acting in the course of their duty, 
causes or appears to have caused death or serious bodily harm.133 Aside from this situation, 
there is no opportunity for the IPCA to initiate an investigation unless a complaint is 
made.134 
 
As discussed, the number of sexual crimes reported to police in the first instance is 
extremely low and in New Zealand sits at nine per cent.135 The amount of complaints 
withdrawn following initial inquiries is high and police handling of the complaint is likely 
to contribute to this. It is unlikely that a complaint to police or the IPCA will result in these 
cases, where victims may be distrusting of the justice system or unaware that the complaint 
mechanism exists. Giving the IPCA the power to investigate where there has not been a 
complaint would ensure greater accountability in relation to sexual crimes in particular. 
Practically, amending the IPCA Act for this purpose could be as simple as removing the 
need for police to cause death or serious bodily harm, to allow the IPCA to investigate. 
This would leave a test of whether an investigation would be in the public interest. The 
IPCA is required by legislation to be led by a current or former judge, therefore it seems 
reasonable to trust them to decide what may or may not be in the public interest, a common 
test which judges apply. 
 
An example of a police review authority with the power to conduct investigations of its 
own initiative is the Police Integrity Commission, which reviews police conduct in New 
South Wales, Australia. The Commission has the ability to investigate both on complaint 
and of its own initiative, with a principal function of preventing, detecting and investigating 
officer misconduct.136 Investigation without complaints have been infrequent in New South 
  
133 Independent Police Conduct Authority Act, s 13. 
134 Independent Police Conduct Authority Act, s 12. 
135 “Sexual Violence in Aotearoa New Zealand” Rape Prevention Education <rpe.co.nz>. 
136 Police Integrity Commission Act 1996 (NSW), s 13, 23. 
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Wales, with most investigations still resulting from complaints. 137 Despite this fact, having 
the ability to investigate of its own motion where necessary would give further strength to 
the IPCA. A further opportunity if there was no requirement of complaint, would be the 
ability to investigate general police practice at a wider scale, for example examining 
generally prosecution decisions in relation to sexual offending. This would provide further 
accountability of the police, encourage consistency between police districts and stations 
and therefore improve the practices of the police.  
 
The IPCA at present has the ability to issue persuasive recommendations. If we are seeking 
to heighten the sanctioning ability of the IPCA, allowing them to issue binding directions 
is a way to do this. This could be in the form of both broad recommendations of changes 
which the police should make to their investigation or prosecution policy and individual 
sanctions which the police should enforce against officers. 
 
There are both benefits and risks associated with increasing the power which the IPCA has. 
As mentioned, it has the ability to increase accountability and ensure transparency. Having 
an external body ensuring sanctions are administered and individual employees are held to 
account means less risk of corruption. Further, it ensures complaints will be responded to 
in line with public expectations of the police. Allowing the IPCA to make binding decisions 
of this nature may raise the question of whether members should be elected. The IPCA has 
recently moved away from having panel members which have an employment history with 
the police.138 It could be suggested that a move to binding decisions would require greater 
police insight into the process given the complex nature of police decision making. Further, 
the ability to directly sanction individual employees rather than recommend criminal 
prosecution or sanctions may be considered inappropriate. Is it better to allow the police to 
determine what the appropriate sanction is for an individual employee based on context 
and factors which may not be known or understood by the IPCA?  
 
Allowing the IPCA to issue binding decisions and directives would be a significant increase 
in its power and would dramatically change the nature of the IPCA and the relationship it 
has with the New Zealand Police. It could frustrate the relationship and remove the 
transparency and openness which it currently holds. The IPCA is working well as an 
advisory authority and it may be a mistake to change its nature in such a fundamental way. 
  
137 Colleen Lewis and Tim Prenzler “Civilian Oversight of Police in Australia” (1999) 141 Australian Institute 
of Criminology: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1 at 5. 
138 “Statement of Intent 2014/15 to 2017-18” (Independent Police Conduct Authority, June 2014) at 8. 
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Conversely, allowing it to investigate of its own accord is a positive development, which 
would increase IPCA power without changing the fundamental nature of the mechanism.  
F The Media 
1 Introduction 
 
The media provides a form of public democratic accountability, holding the police directly 
to account. Due to the direct link to the public, concerns about political independence are 
removed. Media accountability has its own challenges and it cannot be considered as a 
reliable form of accountability, due to its commercial motivations that results in 
inconsistent accountability which will only exist where there is a ‘newsworthy’ story. 
Significant improvements to the mechanism are not appropriate, due to the importance of 
freedom of speech in our democratic society. 
2 Current media accountability 
 
The media is the key forum which links the public with the activities of the government, 
and today it is an essential part of creating democratic accountability. The media can draw 
attention to policing issues and create a forum for general public discussion. The rise of 
‘citizen journalism’ and the increase in mobile technology, has reduced the level of control 
that police have over information disclosure.139 Increased public access to information 
through the media has enabled it to play a “watchdog role”, particularly in relation to the 
exposure of police corruption and malpractice.140 A recent example of this was mobile 
video footage recorded of a shooting by a police officer in the United States of an African 
American man, causing outrage as one of a number of well publicised shootings.141 The 
capturing and publication of footage disproved initial reports that the victim was shot by a 
Taser and resulted in a formal investigation being launched.142 Similarly, extensive media 
coverage and public outrage regarding the police handing of the Roast Busters situation 
resulted in a complaint being made to the IPCA. The consequential investigation revealed 
serious flaws in police handling of the allegations.143 Despite its success in these cases, 
  
139 Louise Cook and Paul Sturges “Police and Media Relations In An Era of Freedom of Information” (2009) 
19 Policing and Society 406 at 421. 
140 At 421. 
141 Andy Campbell “Video Shows Officer Michael Slager Shooting Unarmed Black Man in the Back in South 
Carolina” The Huffington Post (online ed, United States of America, 7 April 2015). 
142 Campbell, above n 133. 
143 Independent Police Conduct Authority, above n 2, at 33. 
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questions must be asked about the functioning and effectiveness of the media as a form of 
accountability. 
 
Bonner refers to the media as a form of social accountability, involving the activities of 
civil society and the media.144 He argues that the media provides a forum for debate “to 
establish who should be held accountable, what they should be held accountable for, and 
how they should be held accountable.”145 Bovens refers to the media as a form of political 
accountability, with the media acting as an informal forum.146 However, Bovens raises 
concerns regarding media accountability, making the point that an important element of 
accountability is allowing the actor sufficient opportunity to explain and justify their 
conduct.147 The media may fall short of effective accountability in this regard where “the 
principle of hearing and being heard is wantonly disregarded” in favour of a better story or 
headline.148 This point goes to the weakness of the media as a form of accountability, rather 
than its existence. 
 
The media provides the most common vehicle for public organisations to be held 
accountable to the citizens of New Zealand. With the police as the actor, and the media as 
the forum, the actor will often have an informal obligation to explain and justify their 
conduct, and to answer questions posed by the media. This obligation may be limited due 
to the media’s search for newsworthy stories. Many examples have been seen of 
consequences faced by political actors as a result of media scrutiny. Judith Collins and the 
‘Oravida scandal’ illustrates how the media can force action from other accountability 
mechanisms such as ministerial accountability, to hold the individual or organization to 
formal account.149 
 
The media can, therefore, be regarded as a relatively weak form of accountability, due to 
its lack of formal power to hold bodies to account and the purpose of the media itself, which 
  
144 Michelle Bonner “Media as Social Accountability: The Case of Police Violence in Argentina” (2009) 14 
Int Journal of Press/Politics 296 at 296. 
145 Bonner, above n 144, at 296. 
146 Bovens, above n 51, at 455. 
147 Mark Bovens “Public Accountability: A Framework for the Analysis and Assessment of Accountability 
in the Public Domain” (paper presented to CONNEX Research Group 2, Democracy and Accountability in 
the EU, the Netherlands) at 23. 
148 At 23. 
149 “Timeline: Judith Collins and Oravida” (5 May 2014) TV3 News <www.3news.co.nz>. 
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is driven by profit.150 Its profit driven nature means that it will only report what is of interest 
to a significant proportion of our population, making it an inconsistent form of 
accountability. The media does remain the most effective mechanism which exists for 
holding the police democratically accountable for their actions. It holds the police 
accountable for the spending of tax payer funds, without involving political bodies who 
have the potential to compromise police independence. It also conveys the findings of other 
accountability mechanisms, such as IPCA reports, to the general public who are likely to 
be otherwise unaware of such findings.  
 
The media has an important constitutional role in revealing corruption or mismanagement, 
although this is limited by the lack of information in their possession. An example of the 
media working to reveal corruption and mismanagement, is the case of Louise Nicholas.  
Media broke a story in which Nicholas alleged she had been raped by police officers in 
Rotorua in the early 1980’s.151 One of the alleged offenders was the Assistant 
Commissioner and District Commander responsible for the Auckland City Police District 
at the time.152 The media reports sparked an internal investigation by police, a Commission 
of Inquiry and a review by the IPCA into the internal inquiry undertaken by the police.153 
Those reports, initially prompted by media, exposed corruption and mismanagement within 
the police force and showed the media working effectively to expose corruption. The 
effectiveness of accountability from this perspective is, again, limited by the media goal of 
finding good news, rather than holding the police to account.  
3 Improvements to media accountability 
 
Improvements to the accountability which media provides are difficult, given the important 
principle of freedom of press and speech. This in itself has benefits and means that the 
media is, in theory, independent of the government and therefore provides a form of 
external accountability, albeit weak. The weakness of this form of accountability comes 
from the commercial nature of the media and the fact that they seek to get the best story, 
rather than the most accurate. I do not attempt to suggest that there is an easy way to change 
this, nor should we given the fundamental principles of our democracy and the importance 
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of the human right to free speech. Other accountability mechanisms rely on complaints to 
act while the media is not limited by this. The media should continue to draw attention to 
issues which other accountability mechanisms may be unable to uncover. This is an 
important element of our democracy and one which should continue.  
 
The main improvement which could be made in relation to the media relates to education. 
Education can inform journalists about areas in which they are reporting, in particular in 
relation to legal issues and therefore allow them to write articles with greater accuracy and 
understanding. That in turn means that the information provided to the general public will 
have greater accuracy.  
G A Prosecutorial Review Authority 
 
Another option which is worth exploration is the possibility of a new body to review 
prosecutorial decisions made across government agencies. This would draw attention to 
the issue of prosecutorial consistency and place importance on ensuring that decision 
making processes are transparent and accountable. A new body would be a significant 
development and there are examples of successful bodies overseas of this nature.  
 
New Zealand has no centralised decision-making agency in relation to prosecution 
decisions. Decisions relating to serious offences prosecuted on indictment are made by the 
Crown Solicitors in each region of New Zealand, while prosecution decisions in relation to 
summary offences are made by the New Zealand Police and government agencies.154 The 
Crown Law Office does provide Prosecution Guidelines, which all prosecuting agencies of 
government follow.155 The Guidelines provide a test for the decision to prosecute, requiring 
that “the evidence which can be adduced in court is sufficient to provide a reasonable 
prospect of conviction” (the Evidential Test) and that “prosecution is requiring in the public 
interest” (the Public Interest test).156  
 
The New Zealand Police are just one government entity which makes prosecutorial 
decisions using the guidelines, creating the potential for inconsistency between government 
departments. Given the absence of judicial intervention, there is a lack of accountability 
for these important prosecutorial decisions. A prosecutorial review commission would 
provide oversight and accountability across all government departments and organisations 
  
154 Crown Law “Solicitor General’s Prosecution Guidelines” (Prosecution Guidelines, July 2013) at [1.1]. 
155 At 1. 
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which are responsible for making prosecutorial decisions. Its purpose would be to control 
abuse of prosecutorial discretion and would likely be of a similar nature to bodies such as 
the IPCA and other commissions.  
 
The commission could be comprised in a similar fashion to the IPCA, led by a Judge, with 
membership given to upstanding citizens within our community who we would trust to 
uphold the rule of law and provide robust and meaningful civilian oversight. Another 
option would be for the panel to consist of civilians, chosen at random in the same manner 
as we currently select jury members in court. Japan’s Prosecutorial Review Commission 
selects its members by this process. Japan has a perceived problem in relation to the non-
prosecution of political and economic elites and the Commission sought to provide 
accountability for prosecutorial decisions and therefore address this issue.157 In New 
Zealand, the non-prosecution of elites is not perceived as a significant problem. It would 
be more consistent with our constitutional structure and other commissions and authorities 
to have a panel consisting of upstanding citizens rather than a jury system, which would 
also create inefficiency and cost. The panel being led by a Judge would further protect the 
integrity and standard of the authority and ensure that investigations are only carried out 
where appropriate and necessary.   
 
The authority would be focused mainly on the proprietary of decisions not to institute 
prosecution and the process which occurred in making the decision.158 They would be 
likely to act on complaints but an important element would be their ability to investigate 
of their own initiative. The commission’s investigations would take place behind closed 
doors given the sensitive and confidential material they would be dealing with. They would 
have similar powers to the IPCA, allowing them to “summon witnesses for examination, 
question prosecutors, ask them for additional information when necessary and seek special 
expert advice on a given case”. 159 After completing its investigations, the authority would 
make a finding based on the legitimacy of the decision and whether or not prosecution 
should or should not have been initiated. This finding could be binding or not, although it 
is suggested that it should not be binding based on experience overseas and New Zealand’s 
current constitutional arrangements.  
  
157 Mark West “Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan’s Answer to the Problem of Prosecutorial 
Discretion” (1992) 92 Colum L Rev 684 at 694. 
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Until recently, decisions of the Japanese Commission were non-binding, though highly 
persuasive. Recently, changes were made to the Commission which have led to wide spread 
criticism regarding the usurping of the government role of prosecuting. The new legislation 
allows the case to go back to the Commission following re-examination by the prosecutors 
resulting in an outcome which could be contrary to the decision of the Commission.160 The 
Commission then has the ability to make a second recommendation, which will be legally 
binding. This results in the formal criminal prosecution of a suspect, whom the prosecutor 
has decided twice not to prosecute.161 It would be unlikely that such broad discretion would 
be given to such a commission in New Zealand, given the common theme within most of 
our commissions that they are able to make recommendations only. Further, it is 
inappropriate for civilians to be able to force the government to prosecute an individual. 
Recommendations may lack sanctioning power, although as has been seen with the IPCA 
they can be very persuasive and encourage positive accountability relationships.  
 
There are significant benefits in having an authority which has oversight across all 
prosecutorial decisions made by the Crown, including those by the police. It would enable 
a group of civilians who should not swayed by political influence to hold prosecutorial 
authorities to account. They would be able to ensure consistency and fairness is present in 
the decision making process and that the Prosecution Guidelines are properly adhered to. 
Despite these benefits, I submit that the decision whether or not to prosecute is highly 
discretionary and the result of the decision burdensome. It would therefore be inappropriate 
to allow a commission to bind the government to prosecute. Another important feature of 
such a commission, is the ability to investigate of its own accord. I have recommended 
such a change to the IPCA and would recommend the same for a prosecutorial review 
commission. Another recommendation would be that if a commission be established, an 
ability to investigate groups of offending such as ‘sexual offending’, would increase 
accountability and therefore improve practices in relation to said groups. 
 
The creation of a new authority may be a disproportionate response to the problem, which 
could result in an ‘accountability overload’ and inefficiency in an already inefficient 
criminal justice system. The problem dealt with in this paper relates to issues of police 
investigative and prosecutorial decision making. I believe that the deficiency in 
accountability which exists in this context can be addressed by improvements to the IPCA 
and the court system. A prosecutorial review authority may be an appropriate development 
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in the future. It has the potential to create greater consistency and accountability across 
government departments, although I do not find it to be a necessary recommendation in 
relation to the problem I seek to address in this paper.  
 
V  Conclusion 
 
The police play a vital role from both a victim and public interest perspective in relation to 
the investigation and prosecution of sexual offending. This paper shows the implications 
of police failing to meet an acceptable standard of conduct. The Roast Busters’ case study 
is an example of unacceptable processes resulting in a failure to conduct an adequate 
investigation and properly consider all prosecution options. From a victim’s perspective, 
these kinds of failings result in a distrust of the justice system and the withdrawal of 
complaints. This is not in the public interest. What is in the public interest is ensuring that 
crimes are dealt with efficiently and effectively. It would be naïve to think that improving 
police accountability can solve the complex problem of increasing the reporting and 
prosecution of sexual offences. However, it is one element of the problem which can be 
addressed and therefore contribute to a solution.  
 
It is clear that police independence is an important principle which must be carefully 
considered to ensure that the correct balance is met between independence and 
accountability. Internal investigation, the IPCA and the media provide limited 
accountability of individual police officers and the police as an organisation in relation to 
investigative and prosecutorial decision making. The courts and the Minister of Police 
provide no formal accountability relationship, although the Minister may be providing an 
informal and potentially inappropriate form of accountability. Using Bovens’ framework, 
police are held to account from the democratic, constitutional and learning perspectives 
although there is significant room for improvement in all three areas. Three key possible 
improvements to police accountability in relation to both investigation and prosecutorial 
decisions have been assessed. 
 
I have recommended that the potential for the courts to use judicial review for prosecutorial 
decisions be considered in more detail. The orthodox position of the courts has been to 
refrain from intervening in such decisions due to their highly discretionary nature and 
constitutional sensitivities. Many of the policy reasons behind this decision do not apply to 
the decision not to prosecute. This is reflected in United Kingdom decisions, where courts 
are more willing to consider judicial review in the case of the decision not to prosecute. I 
recommend the same approach be taken in New Zealand and that more leniency be given 
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to the review of prosecutorial decisions. This will increase accountability and provide 
another mechanism for those seeking to have such decisions reviewed or investigated.  
 
The IPCA is the most important vehicle for formal accountability of police, providing 
external investigation while maintaining police independence. The IPCA is limited in 
power by its inability to investigate of its own accord, particularly in the case of sexual 
offending where complaints about police conduct are likely to be infrequent. I have also 
argued that it is weakened by its inability to formally sanction, though at present the power 
to issue persuasive recommendations is adequate. This paper recommends that the IPCA 
be given the power to investigate police conduct without requiring a complaint. This would 
open the door to the IPCA to conduct wider scale investigations into police processes in 
relation to a specific type of offending such as sexual violence. It could therefore uncover 
problems with processes prior to the involvement of a complainant and avoid victim 
suffering. 
 
The paper has considered the possibility of a prosecutorial review authority to review 
decisions made by all prosecuting authorities. A likely model for New Zealand would be 
one similar to the IPCA, made up of selected citizens and given the power to make 
recommendations only. This seems like an unlikely development, with very little attention 
given in the New Zealand political arena to prosecutorial discretion across the executive.  
 
Prosecutorial discretion is an important function of the police, serving to provide 
independence from political influence throughout the investigation process and when 
deciding whether to prosecute. Notwithstanding the importance of this independence, the 
Police must be held to account effectively. Improvements to the IPCA and a willingness of 
the courts to use judicial review where necessary will improve accountability. It will 
contribute to better practice and results in relation to the investigation and prosecution of 
sexual offence complaints. 
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